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ABSTRACT
The intersection of antitrust and intellectual property circumscribes two
century-long debates. The first pertains to questions about how antitrust
law and intellectual property law interact, and the second pertains to
questions about how parties can exploit property rights, including
intellectual property rights, to exclude competitors. This iBrief finesses
these questions and turns to practical considerations about how
innovation and intellectual property can impinge antitrust enforcement.
This iBrief develops two propositions. First, although collaborative
research and development has often been and remains unwittingly
misunderstood, what is understood about it is consistent with the longstanding observation that antitrust has rarely interfered with
collaborative ventures. Second, shifting focus from “intellectual
property rights” to “uncertain property rights” makes it easier to
understand what innovation and intellectual property imply for
enforcement processes. Both intellectual property and tangible assets
imply the same processes, but the boundaries of intellectual properties
may be uncertain and may, in turn, allow parties to game enforcement
processes in ways that would not be feasible in antitrust matters that
principally feature tangible assets. Even so, uncertain property rights
might not frustrate enforcement processes as the antitrust authorities
may yet be able to factor parties’ strategic behaviors into the design of
antitrust remedies.

INTRODUCTION
“[T]he exigencies of war have thrust into the foreground the whole
topic of the function of patents in our economy. Under the pressure
placed on our economic system, it has become apparent that the
misuse of patents is one of the most serious and difficult problems in
the field of national economic policy.”2
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¶1.
With some adaptation, one might be tempted to believe that this
statement characterizes the status of study and debate today, but this was
Joseph Borkin, chief of the Patent and Cartel Section of the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice in 1943.3 At that time many
observers perceived a “patent problem”—indeed, “the patent problem”—
that stemmed from “[t]he power to exclude others from access to
technology.” 4 Borkin observed, however, that the power to exclude per
se had not been “regarded as subject to attack under the antitrust laws.”5
Instead, antitrust law could be brought to bear on the patent problem
through indirect means. Intellectual property law had developed a patent
misuse exception to “the power to exclude.” 6 Upon being drawn into a
patent infringement suit, defendant entities could appeal to a misuse
defense, whereby a finding of misuse would allow the antitrust
authorities to march in and impose licensing or other remedies. 7
¶2.
Borkin’s observations constitute epilogue to an early effort
within government to investigate three pairwise interactions: interactions
between (1) antitrust law and intellectual property law, (2) antitrust and
innovation, and (3) intellectual property and innovation. In 1938 the
Roosevelt Administration exhorted Congress to assemble the Temporary
National Economic Committee.8 The Committee was charged with
studying, among other things, “the effect of existing tax, patent, and
other Government policies upon competition, price levels,
unemployment, profits, and consumption.” 9 Once the Committee was in
place, the administration interjected the Antitrust Division in a
“systematic attack” on “the problems presented by the abuse of patent
privileges.” 10
¶3.
One can guess that much has changed since 1938. The Patent
and Cartel Section has long been dissolved; from the 1940’s to the
1960’s, systematic attack gave way to glacial extension in the case law of
the misuse defense to a range of licensing practices; 11 extension induced
confusion about the relationship between misuse defenses and antitrust
3

See id.
Id. at 720–21.
5
Id. at 721.
6
See id. at 720–21.
7
Borkin observed that the Antitrust Division had been doing just that:
intervening in private patent litigation. See id. at 721.
8
Joseph Borkin, Patents and the New Trust Problem, 7 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 74, 78 (1940) [hereinafter Borkin, The New Trust Problem].
9
Id. (quoting S.J. Res. 300, 75th Cong., 52 Stat. 705 (1938) §2(a)(3)).
10
Id.
11
Richard Calkins, Patent Law: The Impact of the 1988 Patent Misuse Reform
Act and Noerr-Pennington Doctrine on Misuse Defenses and Antitrust
Counterclaims, 38 DRAKE L. REV. 175, 177 (1989); Note, Is the Patent Misuse
Doctrine Obsolete, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1922, 1924 (1997).
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defenses; 12 all along the way commentators debated the prospect of
supplanting the misuse defense with an outright antitrust defense; 13 and
extension gave way to glacial retreat.14
¶4.
More striking is what has not changed. The statutory basis for
antitrust enforcement may go back as far as the Sherman Act of 1890,
but vigorous debate persists over how antitrust law and intellectual
property law should intersect. 15 It gets worse. More than seventy years
have passed, yet economists and policymakers remain unequipped to
characterize how innovation policies and patent regimes affect
innovation. 16 That leaves them unequipped to design patent systems and
innovation policies.
¶5.
In this iBrief I offer—with more than a little humility—a few
observations about two of the three sets of pairwise interactions. In the
first part of the paper, I offer insight into how commentators have
perceived interactions between antitrust and innovation. Some of the
policy action has turned on the perception that (1) much innovation may
derive from collaborative research and development (R&D), (2)
collaboration between competing entities may yield much of that
innovation, 17 and yet (3) antitrust enforcement may frustrate
12

Bartholomew Diggins, The Patent Anti-Trust Problem, 53 MICH. L. REV. 1093
(1955); Is the Patent Misuse Doctrine Obsolete, supra note 11, at
1924.
13
Diggins, supra note 12, at 1114–15; Is the Patent Misuse Doctrine Obsolete,
supra note 11, at 1931–36.
14
Is the Patent Misuse Doctrine Obsolete, supra note 11, at 1928–31.
15
Herbert Hovenkamp, Restraints On Innovation, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 247,
247–48 (2007); F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes, The Basics Matter: At The
Periphery of Intellectual Property (Stanford Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper
No. 275; Wash. Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 04-02-03, 2004); Daniel
J. Gifford, Antitrust’s Troubled Relations With Intellectual Property, 87 MINN.
L. REV. 1695 (2003); R. Hewitt Pate, Refusals to Deal and Intellectual Property
Rights, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 429, 429–31 (2002).
16
See, e.g., Kenneth Flamm & Sadao Nagaoka, The Chrysanthemum Meets the
Eagle: Japanese and U.S. Innovation Policies Have Been Evolving Since the
19th Century, 24 ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH. 70 (2007); Rudolph Peritz, Rethinking
U.S. Antitrust & Intellectual Property Rights (N.Y. Law Sch. Pub. Law and
Legal Theory, Research Paper Series 04/50 #22, 2005); Bronwyn H. Hall et al.,
Prospects for Improving U.S. Patent Quality via Postgrant Opposition, 4
INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 115 (2004); Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust
Law Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813 (1984).
17
A. Douglas Melamed & Ali M. Stoeppelwerth, The CSU Case: Facts,
Formalism & The Intersection of Antitrust & Intellectual Property Law, 10 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 407 (2002); Robert Pitofsky, Challenges of the New Economy:
Issues at the Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual Property, 68 ANTITRUST
L.J. 913, 913–924 (2001) [hereinafter Pitofsky, Challenges of the New
Economy]; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST
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collaboration. 18 While researchers have much to learn about how parties
organize collaborative R&D, there is empirical research consistent with
the hypothesis that most collaboration has involved parties contributing
complementary know-how and capabilities. 19 Many of those parties may
not even have been direct competitors in any cognizable antitrust market.
Even so, complementarity alone would not get parties off of the antitrust
hook. As Sakakibara observes, it contrasts with theoretical research
which was motivated by policy questions relating to collaboration
between competing entities that contribute fungible inputs.20 The
GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS (2000),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf; Donald F. Turner, Basic
Principles in Framing Antitrust and Misuse Constraints on the Exploitation of
Intellectual Property Rights, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 485 (1985); Senate Report on
The National Cooperation Research Act of 1984, S. REP. NO. 98-427, reprinted
in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3105, 3106 [hereinafter Senate Report]; Joseph Borkin,
THE CRIME AND PUNISHMENT OF I.G. FARBEN (1978) [hereinafter Borkin,
Farben].
18
Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Innovation and Competition:
Implications for Antitrust, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 75 (1990).
19
See, e.g., Joanne E. Oxley & Rachelle C. Sampson, The Scope and
Governance of International R&D Alliances, 25 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 723
(2004); Rachelle C. Sampson, Organizational Choice in R&D Alliances:
Knowledge-Based and Transaction Cost Perspectives, 25 MANAGERIAL
DECISION ECON. 421 (2004); Suzanne E. Majewski & Dean V. Williamson,
Incomplete Contracting and the Structure of R&D Joint Venture Contracts, in
15 ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 201
(Gary D. Libecap ed., 2004) [hereinafter Majewski & Williamson, Incomplete
Contracting]; Suzanne E. Majewski & Dean V. Williamson, Endogenous
Spillovers, Strategic Blocking, and the Design of Contracts in Collaborative
R&D: Evidence from NCRA filings of R&D Joint Ventures (Antitrust Div., U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Econ. Analysis Group, Working Paper 02-1, 2002); Mariko
Sakakibara, Knowledge Sharing in Cooperative Research and Development, 24
MANAGERIAL DECISION ECON. 117 (2003) [hereinafter Sakakibara, Knowledge
Sharing]; Mariko Sakakibara, Heterogeneity of Firm Capabilities and
Cooperative Research and Development: An Empirical Examination of Motives,
18 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 143 (1997) [hereinafter Sakakibara, Heterogenity]; Lee
Branstetter & Mariko Sakakibara, Japanese Research Consortia: A
Microeconometric Analysis of Industrial Policy, 46 J. INDUS. ECON. 207 (1998)
[hereinafter Branstetter & Sakakibara, Microeconometric Analysis]; Peter
Grindley et al., SEMATECH and Collaborative Research: Lessons in the Design
of High-Technology Consortia, 13 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 723 (1994).
20
Seminal contributions include Morton I. Kamien et al., Research Joint
Ventures and R&D Cartels, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 1293 (1992); Claude
d’Aspremont & Alexis Jacquemin, Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in
Duopoly with Spillovers, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 1133 (1988); Michael L. Katz, An
Analysis of Cooperative Research and Development, 17 RAND J. ECON. 527
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suggestion is that it might not be too surprising that the antitrust
authorities have rarely challenged such arrangements as R&D joint
ventures. 21
¶6.
In the second part of this iBrief I make a few observations about
“the intersection of antitrust and intellectual property.” It is a curious
phrase in that one might not immediately discern how it is different from
“the intersection of antitrust and property.” Much of the action turns on
tricky doctrinal questions about how two bodies of law (antitrust law and
intellectual property law) interact. 22 Yet, I explore doctrinal questions
and turn to practical considerations about how intellectual property can
impinge antitrust enforcement. That is, once presented with an antitrust
inquiry—a merger analysis or inquiry into vertical contracting practices,
say—can it make sense to treat intellectual property differently from
other types of property?

(1986); Michael Spence, Cost Reduction, Competition, and Industry
Performance, 52 ECONOMETRICA 101 (1984).
This literature assumes that firms are symmetrical in terms of their
capabilities or knowledge, which implies that the cooperating firms
belong to a single industry. Firms seek to achieve a single R&D
outcome, and it is implicitly assumed that there is only one efficient
way to pursue this outcome. Participating firm, therefore, benefit
from this efficient, non-duplicative approach. It is also implicitly
assumed that firm knowledge and technologies are close substitutes.
A basis for these assumptions is the desire to obtain interesting
equilibrium outcomes from the game-theoretic models. A result,
however, is that this literature only address a limited of cooperative
activity. In contrast, in the managerial literature, firms in alliances
are often recognized to possess heterogeneous capabilities, and they
may or may not be direct competitors in the product market.
Mariko Sakakibara, The Diversity of R&D Consortia and Firm Behavior:
Evidence from Japanese Data, 49 J. INDUS. ECON. 181, 183 (2001) [hereinafter
Sakakibara, The Diversity of R&D Consortia].
21
Melamed & Stoeppelwerth, supra note 17, at 414; Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust
and Intellectual Property: Unresolved Issues at the Heart of the New Economy,
16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535, 544 (2001) [hereinafter Pitofsky, Beyond
Microsoft]; S. REP. NO. 98-427, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3105.
22
See, e.g., Michel J. Carrier, Refusals to License Intellectual Property after
Trinko, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1191 (2006) [hereinafter Carrier, Refusals to
License]; Michael J. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U.
PA. L. REV. 761 (2002); Kieff & Paredes, supra note 15; Gifford, supra note 15;
Melamed & Stoeppelwerth, supra note 17; Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual
Property is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 108, 118 (1990); Turner,
supra note 17; Borkin, The New Trust Problem, supra note 8; Kaplow, supra
note 16 (contending that some of the questions are tricky, because it can be hard
to bring economic analysis to bear).
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¶7.
As a matter of antitrust law, the immediate answer is “no.” To
the extent we can understand both rights over intangible assets and rights
over physical assets as rights to exclude, then, “[e]xcept in the rarest
case, we should treat intellectual and physical property identically in the
law . . . .” 23 Consider, for example, bottleneck assets—assets to which a
party must secure license or physical access in order to commercialize a
good or service. 24 The antitrust authorities would have obvious interest
in a transaction that would allow an entity or collection of entities to
secure a bottleneck where no bottleneck had existed before. Once having
established that a bundle of assets constitutes a bottleneck, distinctions
between physical assets or intangible assets add nothing that one could
not already discern about the ability of the parties controlling the
bottleneck to act as a gatekeeper and exclude rivals.
¶8.
As a matter of antitrust process, the intermediate answer is “yes,”
because intellectual property may allow parties to manipulate
enforcement processes or frustrate remedies to antitrust problems in
ways that would not be feasible in transactions that principally feature
tangible assets. To illustrate this, first consider that delineating
intellectual properties may constitute a nontrivial problem. A line in the
sand might go far toward delineating the bounds of beachfront
properties, and delineating properties may allow enforcement authorities
to identify bottleneck assets, but property rights may be uncertain in that
neither the enforcement authorities nor parties themselves may be able to
distinguish fine lines between intellectual properties. One problem is
that enforcement authorities might find themselves having to decide
whether some bundle of intellectual properties constitutes a bottleneck.
For example, parties to a merger might argue that at least one of them
already maintains a bottleneck, thus inviting the antitrust authorities to
conclude that the merger does not create a bottleneck that had not already
existed. A determination that a merger does not create a new bottleneck
would dismiss an important justification for blocking the merger, but
effectively evaluating the parties’ claim might be problematic. It might
even prove impossible. Alternatively, parties might argue that none of
them maintains a bottleneck and that the consolidation of their
intellectual properties under unified control does not create a new
bottleneck. Again, the antitrust authorities find themselves having to
evaluate a difficult, possibly insoluble, claim.

23

Easterbrook, supra note 22, at 118.
The bottleneck might comprise a telecommunications network. Verizon
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). A
bottleneck may also comprise a bundle of patents. See United States v. 3D Sys.
Corp., No. 1:01CV01237(GK), 2001 WL 964343 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 2001). For
more on 3D Systems and DTM, see infra notes 86–95 and accompanying text.
24
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¶9.
Most of the above discussion here revolves around patents. That
is natural, and, indeed, most discussions in this area revolve around
patents. Patents are observable. They are enumerated and formally
documented, but that leaves out other instruments such as trade secrets
that parties use to protect their investments in R&D. 25 That, in turn,
leaves out important questions about parties’ decisions to patent, to not
patent, to exploit other mechanisms, or to forgo investments in R&D. 26
¶10.
Finally, this overall discussion does not make more than passing
contact with “know-how,” including “tacit knowledge.” Tacit
knowledge is interesting because it is the uncodifiable information in the
heads of engineers over which it is impossible for a firm to assign
property rights. Indeed, it is the kind of stuff that parties might be able to
transfer only by personnel transfers. Non-compete provisions in
engineers’ employment contracts and no-poaching provisions in R&D
joint venture contracts may provide clues about when the real value in a
technology is tied up in know-how and tacit knowledge.

25

As a matter of course, trade secrets are not intended to be observable, and yet
in some industries trade secrets constitute important means of exploiting
investments in technologies. Consider, for example, the importance of trade
secrets to Wal-Mart Stores. Wal-Mart has made it to the top of Fortune 500 by
efficiently distributing merchandise. Its growth has depended on development
of its proprietary merchandising system, and it has endeavored to maintain
secrecy over the design of the system. Secrets, of course, are susceptible to
expropriation by various means including personnel transfers. In 1998 WalMart accused Amazon.com of selectively poaching employees in order to learn
about Wal-Mart’s information systems. The parties settled litigation in 1999
with Amazon agreeing to reassign former Wal-Mart employees to less sensitive
positions within Amazon. See Wal-Mart Agrees to Settle Lawsuit Against
Amazon, N.Y. TIMES, April 6, 1999, at C6.
26
See, e.g., Bharat Anand & Alexander Galetovic, Strategies That Work When
Property Rights Don’t, in ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP,
INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, supra note 19, at 261; Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie H.
Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited: An Empirical Study of Patenting in the
U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979–1995, 32 RAND J. ECON. 101 (2001);
Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability
Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552.; Peter C. Grindley & David J. Teece,
Managing Intellectual Capital: Licensing and Cross-licensing in
Semiconductors and Electronics, 39 CAL. MGMT. REV. 8 (1997); Richard C.
Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and
Development, 18 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACT. 783 (1987).
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I. ANTITRUST & COLLABORATIVE R&D
¶11.
Interactions between antitrust and innovation have made it to the
top of policymakers’ agendas during at least two acute episodes of
national angst. From 1933 and into 1937, the economy had climbed
steadily from the nadir of depression, but by the summer of 1937 it had
commenced another round of sharp contraction.27 The Administration
had to give the appearance of doing something—hence the Temporary
National Economic Committee of 1938.28 Coming into the 1980’s,
severe economic contraction was again an important feature of the policy
environment, but this time it was matched with concerns that Japanese
industry would assume preeminence in the development and production
of semiconductors. 29 The government launched a number of initiatives,
including the National Cooperative Research Act (NCRA) of 1984. 30
The government also took a hand in motivating and subsidizing a
number of research consortia, the most prominent being the
SEMATECH consortium. 31 The NCRA was designed to promote intraindustry collaboration in R&D by relieving R&D joint ventures of some
of the hazards that private antitrust actions could impose. 32 In 1993 the
government enacted the National Cooperative Research and Production
Act (NCRPA), thus extending the protections afforded under NCRA to
production joint ventures. 33 SEMATECH (“Semiconductor
Manufacturing Technology”) was, as the name suggests, designed to
promote collaboration between competitors in the development of
semiconductor manufacturing technologies.34
¶12.
Drawing from that history, antitrust outsiders, and sometimes
insiders, have made at least three kinds of claims. The first pertains to
R&D intensity. 35 In both episodes, policymakers internalized a kind of
“Schumpeterian” notion that larger agglomerations of firms or larger
firms themselves would be better equipped to concentrate the resources
sufficient to pursue ambitious R&D. It then becomes tempting to
suggest that the antitrust authorities should count improved capacity to
conduct R&D as an “efficiency” justification for collaboration between
firms. The second claim pertains to the efficiency of R&D. 36 Some
27

See Ben S. Bernake, Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the
Propagation of the Great Depression, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 257, 261 (1983).
28
The committee was created by S.J. Res. 300, 75th Cong., 52 Stat. 705 (1938).
29
See Flamm & Nagaoka, supra note 16, at 72.
30
Id.; Pub. L. No. 98-462, 98 Stat. 1815 (1984).
31
See generally Grindley et al., supra note 19.
32
See generally S. REP. NO. 98-427 (1984).
33
Pub. L. No. 103-42, 107 Stat. 117 (1993).
34
See Grindley et al., supra note 19.
35
See infra Part I.A.
36
See infra Part I.B.
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observers have suggested that collaboration itself, including
collaboration between competing entities, would enable parties to
conduct R&D more effectively—that is, collaborators should yield more
innovation for each dollar they collectively invest in R&D. “Costsharing”, for example, could promote efficiency by allowing firms to
avoid duplication of costly R&D. Similarly, collaboration might allow
parties to join complementary know-how and capabilities and exploit
“two-heads-are-better-than-one” economies. Either way, the claim
amounts to another efficiency justification for collaboration. Finally,
some observers complained that antitrust analysis is poorly equipped to
characterize competition in “dynamic,” “fast-paced,” “high-tech”
industries. 37 They suggest that the antitrust authorities end up basing
analyses on static snap-shots of prevailing market conditions when those
authorities should do what firms do: attempt to look forward and factor
into their analyses anticipated changes in market conditions.38 Changes
might even include the emergence of new markets—markets that would
not come to exist but for innovation and collaboration. I make a few
observations about each of these points in turn.

A. Collaboration and R&D Intensity
¶13.
The initiatives of the late 1930’s and those of the 1980’s and
1990’s appear similar in at least one respect: in both instances
policymakers maintained a notion that collaborating firms would be
better equipped to mobilize and focus substantial resources on ambitious
R&D. 39 In the first instance, the authorities ascribed to cartels the ability
to collectively concentrate resources.40 Even so, they actively chose to
37

See infra Part I.C.; Pate, supra note 15; Pitofsky, Challenges of the New
Economy, supra note 17; Pitofsky, Beyond Microsoft, supra note 21; Jorde &
Teece, supra note 18.
38
See, e.g., Richard J. Gilbert & Steven C. Sunshine, Incorporating Dynamic
Efficiency concerns in Merger Analysis: The Use of Innovation Markets, 63
ANTITRUST L.J. 569, 571 (1994).
39
Why individual firms could not, or would not access sufficient resources from
external sources remains a question. In this age of venture capital and private
equity, perhaps they do.
40
Joseph Borkin appears again in a pivotal role. In the preface to The Crime
and Punishment of I.G. Farben, Borkin observes that in the early 1930’s he and
others in government became aware of the “cartelization” of munitions-related
industries. One target of the “[anti-]cartel program” launched at the Antitrust
Division was the German conglomerate I.G. Farben. The Division understood
that I.G. Farben had aggressively exercised and policed its patent rights by
entangling global competitors in a web of cross-licenses and patent pools. The
various R&D projects I.G. Farben pursued included the liquefication of coal into
fuel oil. The understanding is that the individual I.G. Farben companies could
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ignore this intuition and instead focused on diminishing the influence of
those same cartels. 41 In the latter instance, the designers of the NCRA
and other programs ascribed to industry consortia the ability to
concentrate resources. 42 They then proceeded to suggest that the
antitrust authorities should not dismiss collaboration between
competitors out of hand.
¶14.
That notion has some of the flavor of one part of the
“Schumpeterian hypothesis” by which greater “firm size” (if not
consortium size or cartel size) should enable firms to invest more
aggressively in R&D. 43 Larger agglomerations might, for example, be

not have pursued the project independently but rather had to merge in order to
concentrate sufficient financial resources under unified control. Borkin, Farben,
supra note 17, at 54.
41
Borkin described the cartel problem as follows:
The formidable arrays of patents collected by industrial combinations for the
purpose of dividing fields into non-competitive spheres, establishing quota
systems of manufacture, controlling the price and use of non-patented articles
and services, ‘blocking off’ developments and ‘fencing in’ licensees and
competitors, can scarcely be considered an incentive to genius or a promotion
of ‘science and useful arts.’ Instead patents have to some extent become
instruments of oppression, representing economic waste through the nonutilization or restricted utilization of the resources of knowledge they embody,
rather than eliminating waste by spurring increased efficiency.

Borkin, The New Trust Problem, supra note 8, at 78.
42
The Senate Report indicates a role for pooling resources. The Report
indicated that
[a]nother and more serious problem is that much important research may never
be done if firms are not able or willing to undertake such research on their own.
Mr. Charles H. Herz, General Counsel of the National Science Foundation,
addressed the problem of foregone collaborative research before the [Senate
Judiciary] Committee: (I)n an era of accelerating technology, development,
increasingly complex and costly R&D, and heightened international
competition, the United States and specific U.S. industries need to be
concerned about research and development that a typical corporation cannot
take on alone.

S. REP. NO. 98-427, at 2 (1984). Peter McClosky, president of the Electronics
Industries Association, continued: “By pooling resources, companies can afford
longer-term research—the fruits of which will be employed to assure our
industrial competitiveness worldwide.” Id.
43
Katz and Shelanski efficiently encapsulate the “Schumpeterian hypothesis”:
[Joseph] Schumpeter's argument that most technological innovation would
come from large corporations with market power and organized R&D
operations implied that the ideal of competition under antitrust law could have
substantial social costs over time. . . . Although Schumpeter wrote [in 1942]
mostly about large firms, their associated economies of scale for R&D, and
their ability to attract capital and talented scientists, his critique of perfect
competition and discussion of the benefits of market power suggest that his
ideal innovators were not only large but dominant as well.
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better equipped to attract external sources of capital or to mobilize
internal sources for ambitious R&D. Even so, both the hypothesis and
the generalized notion to which policymakers subscribed are
problematic. Empirical research has demonstrated some correlation
between firm size and R&D expenditures. A difficulty is that correlation
does not imply causation, and, indeed, researchers still puzzle over the
“structural” relationship between the two. 44 It is not obvious that an
important causal relationship exists. 45 Yet, even if the concentration of
resources within a firm, consortium, or cartel does translate into more
intensive R&D, more intensive R&D itself does not count as an
“efficiency” justification for agglomeration, because it says nothing
about the prospect of overinvestment in R&D.

B. Collaboration and R&D Efficiency
¶15.
The designers of the initiatives of the 1980’s endeavored to
“emulate ‘Japanese style’ collaboration,” by which competing entities
would engage in “government-sponsored cooperative R&D.” 46 The
designers of the NCRA, for example, understood that allowing
competing firms to collaborate would allow them to share costs and thus
avoid “wasteful duplication of research and development efforts.”47
Observers and industry insiders said much the same about the

Michael L. Katz & Howard A. Shelanski, Merger Policy and Innovation: Must
Enforcement Change to Account for Technological Change?, 5 INNOVATION
POL’Y & ECON. 109, 131 (2005).
44
See, e.g., id. at 136; Wesley M. Cohen & Steven Klepper, A Reprise of Size
and R&D, 106 ECON. J. 925, 926 (1996).
45
Cohan and Klepper observe that “policy-makers continue to harbour beliefs
about the advantages of large firm size in R & D competition despite the
apparent absence of empirical evidence that would support these beliefs.”
Wesley M. Cohen & Steven Klepper, A Reprise of Size and R&D, 106 ECON. J.
925, 925 (1996). They go on to suggest, however, that there can be some
advantages that obtain to large firms in conducting R&D. Even so, Katz and
Shelanski summarize the state of understanding as follows:
The evidence overall thus suggests that, to the extent firm size has an effect on
innovation, its magnitude and direction depend on associated industry-level
variables and are susceptible to few general presumptions. The results suggest
that especially large firms like those created by some recent mergers will have
no special tendency—nor any predictable reluctance—to engage in innovation,
and that small, fringe firms may play important roles over time in
technologically advancing markets.

Katz & Shelanski, supra note 43, at 136.
46
Sakakibara, Heterogeneity, supra note 19, at 117.
47
S. REP. No. 98-427, pt. 1, at 2 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3105,
3106.
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government-sponsored SEMATECH consortium. 48 But many, many
funny things happened on the way to the consortium. I will enumerate
six.
1. For the most part, Japanese consortia themselves have not emulated the
Japanese style of collaboration.
Sakakibara observes that the perception of a Japanese style of
collaborative R&D, as well as perception of the success the Japanese
style had, derived largely from case studies and anecdotal evidence.49 In
contrast, analyses of comprehensive data on Japanese consortia suggest
that Japanese consortia have often featured more vertical structures by
which firms would contribute complementary know-how and
capabilities. 50
¶16.

2. Japanese consortia were more often organized as “vertical” structures
rather than “horizontal” structures that would join competing entities.
¶17.
Japanese consortia have comprised “vertical” structures by
which participating entities would contribute complementary know-how
and capabilities and would be less likely to compete directly in a given
market. 51

3. Cost-sharing has been an important feature of much collaborative R&D,
but such collaborations often concentrate research efforts on a single
entity rather than distributing them across several entities.

48

See, for example, the comments of Intel co-founder and Sematech president
Robert Noyce. Robert Noyce, Cooperation Is The Best Way to Beat Japan,
N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1989, at F2; Kenneth S. Flamm, Letter to the Editor, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 14, 1987, at A30.
49
Sakakibara, The Diversity of R&D Consortia, supra note 20, at 182.
50
See Lee Branstetter & Mariko Sakakibara, When Do Research Consortia
Work Well and Why? Evidence from Japanese Panel Data, 92 AM. ECON. REV.
143, 145 (2002) (“Secondly, the government generally sought (not always
successfully) to encourage complete dissemination of all research results to the
participating firms. Furthermore, in selecting participants for consortia formed
since the early 1980s, the government generally sought to bring together firms
with complementary research assets.”); Branstetter & Sakakibara,
Microeconometric Analysis, supra note 19, at 214 (“While R&D managers listed
a number of motivations for seeking to participate in consortia, the most highly
cited reason for seeking to participate in consortia was access to complementary
knowledge assets of other participants.”). See generally Sakakibara,
Heterogenity, supra note 19.
51
Sakikibara, The Diversity of R&D Consortia, supra note 20, at 184–85.
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¶18.
Many Japanese consortia may have featured “vertical”
structures, but cost-sharing has been the dominant feature of some
consortia, including non-Japanese consortia. Roller, Siebert and
Tombak, and Majewski and Williamson, observe, for example, that costsharing has been an important feature of many consortia that have
secured the protection afforded by the NCRA. 52 Majewski and
Williamson further note that such cost-sharing consortia have generally
concentrated R&D efforts on a single entity. 53 That entity might be a
consortium member itself, or it might be an outside entity such as a
university or specialized research house.54

4. Formal economic theory illuminated a “free-riding” problem that could
frustrate collaborative R&D.
¶19.
At the same time policymakers were debating the initiatives of
the early 1980’s, researchers started to take up cost-sharing as an
important motivation for forming research consortia.55 They examined
cost-sharing in environments in which collaboration might induce knowhow to spillover between consortium members. Policymakers would
perceive knowledge spillovers as a positive aspect of collaboration, but
consortium participants might endeavor to frustrate spillovers.
Specifically, they might endeavor to contain spillovers from themselves
to other consortium members, especially if these other members were
direct competitors. At the same time, consortium participants might try
to absorb know-how from those other members without making
significant contributions of their own. That is, individual members might
“free-ride” on the efforts and contributions of others. Collectively,
52

Lars-Hendrik Roller et al., Why Firms Form (or do not Form) RJVs, 117
ECON. J. 1122, 1142 (2007); Majewski & Williamson, Incomplete Contracting,
supra note 19. One may note an outstanding question about self-selection and
the representativeness of the NCRA data: Have consortia featuring cost-sharing
been more likely, less likely, or as likely as other consortia to make NCRA
filings?
53
Majewski & Williamson, Incomplete Contracting, supra note 19 at 218.
54
Majewski & Williamson, Incomplete Contracting, supra note 19. The authors
identify the cost-sharing phenomenon with consortia they identify as “Contract
R&D” – that is, with consortia that contract the services of an outside party such
as a university lab or research house. Id. They also identify cost-sharing with
“Coordinator-led R&D”. Id. Such consortia are distinguished by an entity that
publicly posts the terms of participation and maintains open membership. Id.
That entity might conduct the R&D itself or secure the services of a consortium
member or outside party. Id.
55
Again, seminal contributions include: Spence, supra note 20; Katz, supra note
20; d’Aspremont & Jacquemin, supra note 20, and Morton I. Kamien et al.,
supra note 20.
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consortium members might end up contributing less vigorously to
collaborative R&D than they would had they not individually perceived
the free-rider problem.
5. The first incarnation of SEMATECH experienced free-rider problems.
¶20.
Grindley, Mowery and Silverman observe that SEMATECH
participants perceived the free-rider problem and ended up participating
less vigorously in the consortium. 56 Several years into the program,
SEMATECH adapted by taking on a more vertical structure that would
encourage participants to share complementary know-how.

6. Japanese policymakers have come to model some of their own innovation
policies after American policies.
¶21.

Flamm and Nagaoka observe that
[i]t is widely believed in Japan that the strong basic research capability
of U.S. universities supported by a high level of federal support, close
collaboration between industry and universities, and strong protection
of intellectual property rights have been major contributing factors to
the impressive recovery of the U.S. economy since the early 1980s . . .
. Close partnerships between universities and industry have enabled
basic scientific capabilities to be transformed into emergent new
industries in areas such as biotechnology and information
technology. 57

They further observe that, since the mid-1990’s, the Japanese have
adopted policies to promote industry-university partnerships. 58
¶22.
Taken all together, it is not surprising that the antitrust
authorities in the United States have rarely challenged R&D consortia.59
Policymakers assembled programs like the NCRA to address concerns
that private antitrust actions or government enforcement could frustrate
procompetitive collaboration between competitors.60 Policymakers
identified “Japanese style” collaboration with the kind of collaboration
they had hoped to promote. 61 Yet, with the exception of a few highly
publicized, government-sponsored consortia such as SEMATECH, there
is little evidence that consortia in the United States or even Japan have
tended to organize themselves around the purportedly “Japanese style.”
56

Grindley et al., supra note 19.
Flamm & Nagaoka, supra note 16, at 73.
58
Id.
59
S. REP. NO. 98-427, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3105; Turner, supra note
17; Pitofsky, Challenges of the New Economy, supra note 17.
60
Senate Report, S. REP. NO. 98-427, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3105.
61
Id. at 3106.
57
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The federal government has subsidized many consortia through its
various programs at the Department of Defense and through the
Advanced Technology Program (ATP) maintained at the Commerce
Department. 62 Even so, data available through the NCRA program
suggest that government-subsidized consortia as well as other consortia
tend either to concentrate R&D on a single entity or to aggregate
complementary know-how, capabilities, and efforts from a range of
entities. 63 Similarly, evidence from the ATP program suggests that ATPsubsidized consortia tend not to feature entities that are direct market
rivals. 64
¶23.
Complementarity alone would not relieve any one venture of
antitrust scrutiny, but it does provide some basis for the claim that
antitrust has given “wide latitude to joint research and development
[even] among competitors.” 65 A question remains about whether data
from the ATP and NCRA are representative of all consortia. It might be
the case that many consortia comprise entities that the antitrust
authorities would recognize as “actual or potential competitors” in some
market. The prospect of actual or potential competition invites scrutiny,
and theory has illuminated the possibility that actual or potential
competitors might be able to exploit collaboration in R&D to soften
competition. 66 Even so, the same theory recognizes a role for avoiding
the duplication of costly R&D, an effect that the antitrust authorities
would count as procompetitive.

C. Dynamic Competition
¶24.
Antitrust might be occupied with understanding interactions
between “actual or potential competitors” in existing markets. But what
of potential competition in markets that have yet to emerge? Also,
consider the situation of two parties who might not presently compete in
an antitrust-cognizable market. Knowledge spillovers and R&D effort
might enable one to become the rival of another in an existing market.
Can the antitrust authorities accommodate the realization of such
potential competition? Also, should antitrust formally recognize the
R&D process itself as a dimension along which firms compete?

62

Since 1990, the Commerce Department has subsidized individual firms and
consortia through the ATP.
63
Majewski & Williamson, Incomplete Contracting, supra note 19, at 216–18.
64
Mariko Sakakibara & Lee Branstetter, Measuring The Impact of U.S.
Research Consortia, 24 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 51, 65 (2003).
65
Turner, supra note 17, at 486.
66
See, e.g., Katz, supra note 20, at 529.
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¶25.
These questions relate to a larger question about “dynamic
competition.” Parties might make investments now—in R&D, in
production capacity, in brand equity, and so on—that will enable them to
later commercialize goods and services in existing markets or new
markets. None of that is specific to R&D, but investment in R&D is
interesting because it might tend to be more “disruptive” than other types
of investment. R&D might, for example, yield innovations that render
rivals’ production capacity obsolete, thus leading to dramatic shifts in
market shares.
¶26.
Jorde and Teece suggested that the antitrust authorities should
recognize innovation as an important dimension of dynamic competition
and should, therefore, be more circumspect about applying traditional
antitrust analysis that depends on static snap-shots of market
conditions. 67 The interpretation of Gilbert and Sunshine was more
ambitious. They contemplated actual and potential competition in the
R&D process itself, 68 and their ideas found expression in the Intellectual
Property Guidelines in the language of “innovation markets.” 69 The
concept of innovation markets constituted a way of explicitly
recognizing investment in R&D as a dimension of competition. Of
course, one can imagine extending analysis of actual and potential
competition to investment in general rather than limiting it to investment
in R&D, but the point is that the concept of innovation markets
constituted an attempt to formalize antitrust analysis of dynamic
competition.
¶27.
From the beginning, the concept of innovation markets had
critics, 70 and operationalizing it has sometimes proven difficult.71 Some

67

Jorde & Teece, supra note 18, at 86–89. The authors’ concerns also extended
to private parties. Jorde and Teece observed that parties might participate in
collaborative R&D in order to situate themselves to compete in emerging or
existing markets. Collaboration might, for example, allow them to tap into the
complementary know-how and capabilities of other parties. Id. at 78. Jorde and
Teece suggested, however, that rivals excluded from collaboration might be
tempted to characterize collaborative agreements as anticompetitive and might
thus be able to frustrate collaboration with costly antitrust litigation. Id.
68
Gilbert & Sunshine, supra note 38, at 571.
69
ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY §
3.2.3 (1995), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm.
70
See, e.g., Robert J. Hoerner, Innovation Markets: New Wine in Old Bottles?,
64 ANTITRUST L.J. 49, 55 (1995) (suggesting that the concept of “innovation
markets” would provide a new means of attacking “conglomerate” mergers);
Richard T. Rapp, The Misapplication of the Innovation Market Approach to
Merger Analysis, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 19, 20 (1995) (noting that the concept
constitutes little more than another way to frame “potential competition” and to
invite the enforcement hazards that attend “potential competition”).
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observers further note that the question of how to formally operationalize
antitrust analysis of competition in R&D remains open.72 Even so, some
observers suggest that certain R&D-intensive industries, such as
pharmaceuticals, are more amenable to the concept of innovation
markets. 73 Ironically, these industries may be more amenable to the
concept, because they are static in certain ways. Specifically, these
industries might be R&D-intensive, but, like pharmaceuticals, they might
be less susceptible to “disruptive” changes in market structure.
Industries that depend on designing molecules—pharmaceuticals,
chemicals, certain lines of agri-business, and so on—fit the pattern.
Further, it may be no accident that those same industries are ones in
which patents have constituted the principal means of appropriating
returns to R&D. 74
¶28.
I put aside questions about how to formally incorporate R&D
into antitrust analysis and observe that static analysis can capture certain
strategic aspects of competition involving intellectual property. 75
Specifically, when examining a merger or contractual relationship,
invoking “intellectual property” amounts to claiming that at least two
parties are contributing complementary inputs to the commercialization
of some good or service. That, in turn, amounts to illuminating
important “vertical” relationships: the owner of some intellectual
property may grant to other parties’ rights-of-way to commercialize a
good or service, and those other parties contribute inputs to the actual
commercialization.
¶29.
Merely identifying vertical relationships imparts structure to
antitrust analysis in at least two ways. First, it allows investigators to
avoid certain types of inappropriate enforcement actions. Two firms
might have the appearance of competing in a market for some good or
service, yet one of those firms might maintain a bottleneck over one of
the inputs. That firm might, for example, own a bundle of patents to
71

See Richard J. Gilbert & Willard K. Tom, Is Innovation King at the Antitrust
Agencies? The Intellectual Property Guidelines Five Years Later, 69 ANTITRUST
L.J. 43, 83 (2001) (noting innovation market analysis in antitrust cases has been
unnecessary to reach the outcomes).
72
See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Two Puzzles Resolved: Of the SchumpeterArrow Stalemate and Pharmaceutical Innovation Markets, 93 IOWA L. REV.
393, 415 (2008) (suggesting a new test for analyzing innovation markets in
antitrust cases).
73
Id.
74
See, e.g., Ashish Arora, Patents, Licensing, and Market Structure in the
Chemical Industry, 26 RES. POL’Y 391, 401 (1997); Cohen et al., supra note 26,
at 2; JOSEPH BORKIN & CHARLES A. WELSH, GERMANY’S MASTER PLAN (1943).
75
The brief discussion here parallels the more extensive discussion in Part 3 of
the Intellectual Property Guidelines on “Technology Markets” and “Horizontal
and Vertical Relationships.”
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which any other firm would have to secure a license. Granting a license
may thus give the appearance of competition in the goods market. A
merger of the two firms would, in turn, give the appearance of a
reduction of competition in the goods market, but that competition is
something of a fiction to begin with because it depends on the patent
holder exercising its option to grant rights-of-way to other parties. 76
Accordingly, it would be inappropriate to conduct analysis of such a
merger without accounting for the vertical relationship between licensor
and licensee.
¶30.
Second, identifying important vertical relationships allows
investigators to identify certain concerns that would otherwise be missed.
Consider, for example, an environment in which two firms maintain
distinct patent positions that situate them to separately grant rights-ofway to commercialize goods in a particular goods market. Suppose,
further, that no other party is situated to grant rights-of-way. A merger
of the two patent-holding firms would allow the merged entity to secure
a bottleneck where no bottleneck had existed before. (It is not obvious
that such a situation often arises, but I will present an example below.)
The merging parties might not even produce goods themselves, in which
case, the merger would give the appearance of no concentration in the
goods market, but that would mask the reality of merger to monopoly in
the technologies to which parties must secure license to produce goods at
all. The merged entity would then be in a position to impose licensing
terms that would allow it to secure monopolistic returns.

II. ANTITRUST AND UNCERTAIN PROPERTY RIGHTS
¶31.
The intersection of antitrust and intellectual property
circumscribes two century-long debates. The first pertains to the
question of how antitrust law and intellectual property law interact.
Observers will know, however, that decisions like CSU 77 and Trinko, 78 in
2000 and 2004 respectively, precipitated another cycle of vigorous
debate within antitrust about how parties can exploit property rights,
including intellectual property rights, to exclude rivals. Indeed, if one
views intellectual property through an antitrust lens, then one stumbles
into the hundred-years debate about “refusals to deal,” “exclusionary

76

What if the patent holder exercised its option to deny rights-of-way? Failing
to grant a license or withdrawing a license gets into controversial antitrust
questions about “refusals to deal.” For further explanation, see infra Part II.
77
CSU v. Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322 (3d Cir. 2000).
78
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398 (2004).
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conduct,” and “monopolization.” 79 It becomes natural, for example, to
consider how a patent holder might condition patent licenses or
selectively refuse licenses to frustrate or “exclude” rivals. But, as
Hovenkamp observes, “Notwithstanding a century of litigation, the scope
and meaning of exclusionary conduct under the Sherman Act remain
poorly defined. No generalized formulation of unilateral or multilateral
exclusionary conduct enjoys anything approaching universal
acceptance.”80
¶32.
A problem with intellectual property rights is that they may also
be poorly defined. At first sight, there is nothing distinctive about
intellectual property rights, in that, like any property rights, they invite
process—formal process to which parties may appeal to sort out property
rights violations. A difficulty is that “the boundaries of intellectual
property rights are often uncertain and difficult to define, so that neither
the intellectual property holder nor competitors know the precise extent
of protection afforded by the intellectual property right without a
decision from a court or binding arbiter.” 81 That is not the end of it.
That court or binding arbiter will be no better situated than litigants
themselves to delineate intellectual properties, and yet process may
impose on a court or an arbiter the obligation to impose a decision. Nor
would enforcement authorities be better situated, and yet, antitrust
enforcement may also impose an obligation on the authorities to
distinguish fine lines between intellectual properties.
¶33.
The problem of delineating property rights imposes some
practical difficulties on antitrust enforcement. I outline just one:
uncertain property rights can impose constraints on the design of
remedies to merger transactions. A candidate remedy to a problematic
79

See, e.g., Emanuela Arezzo, Intellectual Property Rights at the Crossroad
between Monopolization and Abuse of Dominant Position: American and
European Approaches Compared, 24 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER INFO. L. 455
(2007); Carrier, Refusals to License, supra note 22; Herbert Hovenkamp,
Exclusion and the Sherman Act, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 147 (2005) [hereinafter
Hovenkamp, Exclusion and the Sherman Act]; Douglas A. Melamed,
Exclusionary Conduct Under the Antitrust Laws: Balancing, Sacrifice, and
Refusals to Deal, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1247 (2005); Eleanor M. Fox, Is
There Life in Aspen after Trinko? The Silent Revolution of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 153 (2005); Gifford, supra note 15; Melamed
& Stoeppelwerth, supra note 17; Pate, supra note 15; Pitofsky, Beyond
Microsoft, supra note 21.
80
Hovenkamp, Exclusion and the Sherman Act, supra note 79, at 147–48
(citation omitted).
81
See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N., ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING
INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 4 (2007), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/hearings/ip/222655.htm.
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merger transaction may, for example, take the form of a divestiture by
which the merging parties spin off a bundle of assets to a third party.
When property rights are uncertain, it may not be obvious what rights-toexclude attend any one divested asset. At the same time, however, it
may yet be understood that a certain bundle of assets comprises rights-toexclude that are extensive enough such that the bundle would constitute a
bottleneck if secured under unified control. 82 Consider, then, a merger
transaction that would allow the merged entity to secure the bottleneck.
One candidate remedy might feature the spin-off of some subset of assets
in that bundle. One might, for example, look for a divestiture package
that (1) breaks the bottleneck by yielding to third party rights-of-way to
commercialize a good or service while (2) simultaneously preserving the
rights-of-way of the merged entity. Securing such a result amounts to
saying that the bottleneck actually encompassed two bundles of assets,
each of which separately affords rights-of-way. 83 Such a divestiture
package might exist, but consider the alternative. Given the uncertainty
of property rights, it may not be obvious that a divestiture package yields
rights-of-way to any one party without denying rights-of-way to another.
In such a case, one might relieve concerns about the merger transaction
by crafting a remedy that yields access to the bottleneck to third parties
by long-term contract. A contract is less severe than an outright

82

The fact pattern might seem contrived, but consider the patent thicket
phenomenon articulated by Gilbert and Newbery, and Carl Shapiro. Richard J.
Gilbert & David M.G. Newbery, Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of
Monopoly, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 514, 514 (1982); Carl Shapiro, Navigating the
Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting,
INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 119, 119 (2001). In some environments, an
individual patent might not vest the patent holder with the capacity to block
others from commercializing a technology. In contrast, control of a portfolio of
individually weak patents might constitute a bottleneck.
83
The experiences of Procter & Gamble (P&G) and Kimberly-Clark (KC) in the
“Diaper Wars” are illustrative. On October 11, 1985, P&G and KC separately
filed applications for patents pertaining disposable diapers with elasticized legs.
Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Distrib. 973 F.2d 911, 912–13
(1992). In 1989 KC sued P&G for infringement, and the parties pursued the
matter all the way to a judgment, thus forcing the judge to sift through decades
of patent claims and delineate the boundaries between the two parties’ portfolios
of claims. Id. The judgment amounted to partitioning the claims into two
channels for commercializing two variants of diapers with elasticized legs. Id.
The judgment also assigned one channel to KC and the other to P&G. Id.
Licensees seeking to commercialize either variant thus ended up having to
secure a license from either KC or P&G. Id. Both P&D and KC subsequently
pursued separate and successful patent infringement litigation against other
parties.
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divestiture and has the advantage of preserving the access to the
bottleneck of more than one competing entity.
¶34.
In the context of patents, the long-term contract would amount to
a licensing agreement. But at least one more complication remains: to
determine what patents to include in a license. Antitrust authorities often
find themselves having to choose patents from a portfolio of patents, a
situation where hazards are abound. A divestiture package may
enumerate some number of patents, but that leaves open the prospect
that, post-merger, the merged entity pulls some other bundle of patents
out of its hat—patents that may yet support infringement claims against
licensors. The capacity to assert infringement matters, because it may
allow the merged entity to frustrate the ability of licensors to compete,
thus, defeating the purpose of the licensing remedy. 84 There are, of
course, alternatives to enumerating patents. The principal alternative is to
do what firms do when facing the same hazards: finesse the enumeration
of patents and the hazards that enumeration invites by granting rights-ofway to commercialize goods or services encompassed within a “field-ofuse.” 85

A. Example of a field-of-use licensing remedy: The acquisition of
DTM by 3D Systems
¶35.
In 2001, the Department of Justice challenged the proposed
acquisition of DTM Corporation (DTM) by 3D Systems Corporation
(3D). 86 Both 3D and DTM developed and manufactured “rapid
prototyping” (RP) equipment, and both firms maintained extensive
patent portfolios relating to two different RP technologies. 87 3D’s patent
position allowed it to secure rights-of-way in the United States to
commercialize an RP technology known as “stereolithography,” and 3D

84

See Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Characteristics of Patent
Litigation: A Window on Competition, 32 RAND J. ECON. 129, 147 (2001)
(examining the types of patents most frequently litigated). See generally Jean O.
Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, Tilting the Table? The Use of Preliminary Injunctions,
44 J.L. & ECON. 573 (2001) (arguing that preliminary injunctions are misused in
patent litigation to limit competition).
85
See, e.g., Grindley & Teece, supra note 26, at 9 (discussing fields-of-use in
the licensing of intellectual property relating to electronics and semiconductors).
86
United States v. 3D Sys. Corp., No. 1:01CV01237(GK), 2001 WL 964343
(D.D.C. Aug. 16, 2001).
87
See Competitive Impact Statement at 1, United States v. 3D Sys. Corp., Civ.
No. 1:01CV01237(GK) (D.D.C. September 4, 2001), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f9000/9019.pdf.
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had successfully used its position to deny rights-of-way to other parties
to commercialize stereolithographic systems in the United States. 88
Similarly, DTM’s patent position allowed it to secure rights-of-way to
commercialize an RP technology known as “laser sintering,” and it had
managed to frustrate the efforts of other parties to commercialize laser
sintering systems in the United States. 89 Other firms commercialized
different RP technologies in the United States, but importantly, the
government distinguished high-end “industrial rapid prototyping
systems” from lower-end systems. 90 The Department’s complaint
alleged that the proposed acquisition would “substantially lessen
competition in the development, production and sale of industrial RP
systems sold in the United States . . . .” 91
¶36.
The parties subsequently reached a settlement with the
government by which the merged entity would yield rights-of-way to a
third party to commercialize an industrial RP system in the United
States. 92 The third party would secure rights-of-way by means of a
license from 3D Systems to commercialize RP systems in either of two
fields-of-use indicated as “SL Technology” (stereolithography) and “LS
Technology” (laser sintering). 93 Further, the government restricted
candidate licensors to firms that had already commercialized industrial
RP systems in stereolithography or laser sintering. 94 Among the
candidates were firms that had commercialized stereolithography and
laser sintering systems in Europe and Asia. 95
¶37.
The formulation of the license in terms of a field-of-use relieved
the government of having to indicate specific patents that might
otherwise have been included in a more traditional patent license.
Affirmatively specifying patents in a license would have opened up the
prospect that, post-acquisition, 3D could exploit patents excluded from
the license to assert infringement against the licensor. Drawing the
licensee into patent infringement litigation could frustrate the licensee’s
efforts to commercialize an industrial RP system in the United States.

CONCLUSION
¶38.
Antitrust enforcement and innovation policy may make for an
odd, strangely compatible couple, if not the odd couple, in that the one
88

Id. at 7.
Id. at 4–5.
90
Id. at 1–2.
91
Id. at 6.
92
Id. at 2.
93
Id. at 4.
94
Id. at 1–2.
95
Id. at 5.
89
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(innovation policy) has been worried about interference from the other
(antitrust) while the other has been blithely getting on with its business.
Policymakers have, for example, long appreciated that collaboration,
including collaboration between competitors, could promote innovation.
Never mind that collaborative R&D remains poorly understood. The
expectation had been that collaboration would promote the efficiency of
R&D by allowing parties to avoid duplicative R&D and to join
complementary know-how and capabilities. Yet policymakers worried
that the prospect of antitrust scrutiny could frustrate that same
collaboration. The antitrust authorities, of course, are interested in the
consequences of collaboration for competition, but even before
enactment of the wave of innovation-minded initiatives in the 1980’s and
1990’s, there was little evidence that antitrust was getting in the way of
collaborative R&D. Since then, researchers have gathered some
evidence which suggests that most of the action in collaborative R&D
has involved collaboration between parties who are not direct
competitors in existing goods markets. Perhaps it is not surprising, then,
that parties who are not actual competitors tend to contribute
complementary inputs to collaborative R&D. There is even evidence
that parties factor the potential for future competition into their decisions
to join (or not join) collaborative R&D efforts. In all of this, there are no
obvious justifications for the antitrust authorities to mount challenges
against collaborative R&D.
¶39.
What does innovation imply for antitrust enforcement?
Investment in R&D—the stuff that yields innovation—depends
importantly on the efforts of parties to police their intellectual properties.
Shifting the focus from “intellectual property rights” to “uncertain
property rights” makes it easier to understand what innovation and
intellectual property really imply. They imply the same enforcement
processes, but they do complicate those processes. The antitrust
authorities may find themselves facing the prospect of delineating
intellectual properties. Yet unlike judges in a patent infringement case,
the antitrust authorities may have alternatives. Like private parties, they
may be able to finesse the problem by appealing to concepts such as
fields-of-use rather than delineating intellectual properties. Also, many
observers will know that uncertain property rights do not preclude the
possibility of identifying bundles of assets that would constitute
bottlenecks if concentrated under unified control. That may allow the
authorities to conduct their analyses without extra complication.

